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MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd. v Rock Advertising Ltd. [2016] EWCA Civ 553 
deals with a number of important issues concerning variation of contracts. Rock occupied as 
licensee premises managed by MWB. In August 2011, Rock decided to expand its business, 
and entered into a written agreement with MWB for larger premises for 12 months beginning 
1 November 2011. The licence fee was agreed to be £3,500 per month for the first three 
months, and then £4,433.34 from 1 February 2012. Unfortunately, Rock’s business was not 
as successful as hoped, and by late February 2012 had incurred arrears of over £12,000. 
MWB gave notice purporting to terminate the agreement, but the parties then orally agreed to 
re-schedule the licence fee payments due from February to October 2012: Rock would pay 
less than the originally agreed amount for the first few months, but after that would pay more, 
with the result that the arrears would be cleared by the end of the year. Pursuant to this 
agreement, Rock paid £3,500 to MWB, which was the first instalment due in accordance with 
the revised payment schedule. However, MWB subsequently changed its mind and sued for 
the arrears. MWB presented two arguments for why Rock could not rely upon the oral 
variation. First, MWB pointed to an anti-oral variation clause in the written contract. 
Secondly, MWB relied upon Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 for the proposition that 
the variation was not supported by consideration. Both arguments failed before a unanimous 
Court of Appeal (Arden, Kitchin and McCombe L.JJ.).  
Clause 7.6 in the original contract stated: 
“... All variations to this licence must be agreed, set out in writing and signed on 
behalf of both parties before they take effect.” 
This raised a tricky question of law: can an anti-oral variation clause be varied other than in 
accordance with that clause? Before this year, that was a difficult question to answer due to 
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal (compare United Bank Ltd. v Asif (11 February 
2000, unreported) and World Online Telecom v I-Way Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 413). This 
inconsistency was fully considered in Globe Motors Inc. v TRW Lucas Varity Electric 
Steering Ltd. [2016] EWCA Civ 396, in which the Court of Appeal concluded that it was 
possible to vary a contract orally despite an anti-oral variation clause. The discussion in 
Globe Motors on this issue was obiter, but unsurprisingly followed by the Court of Appeal in 
MWB, and the clarity brought by these decisions is welcome. In principle, “party autonomy” 
means that any term can be varied by the parties, and this includes anti-oral variation clauses. 
As Cardozo J. said in Alfred C Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Company (1919) 225 N.Y. 
380, at 387, “Those who make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which forbids a change, 
may be changed like any other.” Nevertheless, anti-oral variation clauses may continue to 
serve some purpose in reducing frivolous claims of an oral agreement: a party might well find 
it difficult to establish that both parties intended any oral accord to alter their legal relations, 
especially where they originally included a term that requires formal variation (e.g. Globe 
Motors, at [117] per Underhill L.J.). 
 On the facts of MWB, the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the variation was 
intended to be legally binding and supported by consideration. This latter conclusion is 
perhaps a little surprising. MWB was owed over £12,000, and a further licence fee of over 
£4000 per month. Rock paid £3,500 only. This looks very much like part payment of a debt, 
and Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a and Foakes v Beer make it clear that part payment 
of a debt is not good consideration for the extinguishment of that debt. Had MWB accepted 
not a lesser sum of money but instead a “horse, hawk or robe” (per Lord Coke in Pinnel’s 
Case) as full satisfaction of Rock’s debt, the decision would have been entirely orthodox. 
This is because in giving the horse, hawk or robe the debtor is doing something which he is 
not obliged to do; and the court will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration if the 
creditor freely accepts that horse, hawk or robe as full satisfaction for the extinguishing of the 
debt (cf. MWB at [85] per Arden L.J.). But whilst a creditor might place his own idiosyncratic 
value on a horse, it is impossible to value less money as being more valuable than a greater 
sum of money (unless, for example, payment is made earlier than agreed or in a more 
convenient form). That explains the rules in Pinnel’s Case and Foakes v Beer. 
The Court of Appeal circumvented this principle on the basis that MWB did not only 
receive part-payment of a debt but further received a “practical benefit”. This practical 
benefit was present because MWB would ultimately be likely to recover a greater sum from 
Rock, and – most significantly – MWB would avoid the property standing empty for some 
time, causing further loss. This extension of “practical benefit” to the context of part-payment 
of debt is novel but not entirely unexpected. After all, in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls 
(Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 Q.B. 1 the Court of Appeal held that a promise to pay more might 
be supported by consideration if the promisor “obtains in practice a benefit or obviates a 
disbenefit”. Unfortunately, Roffey did not cite Foakes (a decision of the House of Lords), and 
it has been unclear how the two decisions fit together. This was recognised by Peter Gibson 
L.J. in In re Selectmove Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 474, who said “it is in my judgment impossible, 
consistently with the doctrine of precedent, for this court to extend the principle of Williams’s 
case to any circumstances governed by the principle of Foakes v Beer ... If that extension is 
to be made, it must be by the House of Lords or, perhaps even more appropriately, by 
Parliament after consideration by the Law Commission”. This was an understandable 
approach for the Court of Appeal to adopt, but left the law in an unsatisfactory state: the 
performance of an obligation to render services may be good consideration (Roffey), but the 
performance of an obligation to pay money may not (Foakes). This distinction has largely 
been wiped away by MWB. 
So what is left of Foakes v Beer? Perhaps it is limited to its own facts concerning 
payment of a debt by instalments (see e.g. MWB at [84] per Arden L.J.). But even then 
perhaps the promisee will now be able to identify a “practical benefit” conferred upon the 
promisor (cf. Lord Blackburn’s quasi-dissent in Foakes v Beer). This highlights the need to 
be clear about what “practical benefit” means. On the facts of MWB, it was of course 
arguable that (at least until the end of the contract period) MWB was entitled both to the full 
sum of money due, and to expect that the property would not be left standing empty anyway. 
As a result, it might be thought that this is akin to Foakes v Beer in that MWB did not receive 
anything to which it was not already entitled. However, it is not entirely clear whether Rock 
was entitled to leave the property standing empty under the original agreement, and Arden 
L.J. placed some emphasis on the fact that MWB requested or at least indicated it wanted this 
benefit from the renegotiation. Such a request (and the lack of duress) is likely to be crucial in 
identifying a practical benefit. 
 Since the oral variation was supported by consideration, there was no need to consider 
Rock’s alternative argument that MWB was estopped from going back on its promise. 
However, the Court of Appeal found that such a claim would not have succeeded. Even 
though MWB had received a “practical benefit”, Rock had suffered no detriment, and could 
readily be restored to its previous position: it was not inequitable for MWB to go back on its 
representation. Kitchin L.J. emphasised that it would not be inequitable to go back on the 
promise simply because the representee made a payment in reliance on a representation (cf. 
Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ 1329, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 643, 
which only concerned summary judgment: see MWB at [92] per Arden L.J.). Kitchin LJ also 
thought that although promissory estoppel will often only suspend an obligation, estoppel 
might operate to extinguish the obligation, depending on the nature of the promise made: 
“[a]ll will depend upon the circumstances” (at [61]). 
MWB highlights that the decision in Foakes might be attacked on one side through 
adopting a “practical benefit” approach to consideration, and on the other side from 
promissory estoppel. Both routes can effectively mean that a debtor does not have to pay the 
entirety of the debt. If the very same facts of Foakes v Beer were to arise today, it is perhaps 
unclear what result a court would favour. In 1937 the Law Revision Committee 
recommended a departure from Foakes, essentially because a creditor would obtain a 
practical benefit from the prompt payment of part of a debt rather than trying to insist on the 
payment of the whole sum due. But it is significant that Parliament has not accepted or 
implemented those reforms. Moreover, the decision in Foakes has been supported by some 
commentators, not least because it provides clear guidance as to what constitutes 
consideration (see e.g. J. O’Sullivan, “In Defence of Foakes v Beer” (1996) 55 C.L.J. 219). 
As a result, it is not entirely satisfactory for the Court of Appeal effectively to side-step 
Foakes and resort to the notion of “practical benefit” which was clearly not endorsed by the 
House of Lords in Foakes itself. In the absence of legislation, it is to be hoped that the 
Supreme Court will soon have the opportunity to provide guidance on this issue. 
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